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Abstract 
 
Grappling with ethical issues in environmental studies is notoriously challenging, particularly for those working in the 
scientific/technical domain. The divide between humanities and science was famously expressed in terms of two cultures by 
C.P.Snow in his 1959 critique of the prevailing dismissive attitude towards science within Government.  An ensuing rebuke to 
Snow in the 1960s suggested that it was scientists that worked in a moral vacuum.  Calls for more responsible science have 
since become even more urgent with increasing environmental risks. The paper describes a simple adaptable heuristic for 
professionals coming from a more scientific background to work with ethical issues of environmental responsibility. The 
heuristic, arising from over fifteen years of experience in teaching environmental ethics to mature part-time study fellows at 
The Open University mostly from a technical professional background, provides a practical means of bridging the divide 
between science and humanities. Three recurring and interrelated questions of responsibility are addressed – (i) what 
matters, in terms of issues, (ii) who matters (and how), in terms of agency, and (iii) why some matters and issues of agency 
are prioritised over others, in terms of justification.  The heuristic can be adapted for dealing with moral issues of 
responsibility where caring for the environment whilst demonstrating accountability are regarded as important for 
developing professional and/or personal capacity.  Some of the challenges that remain in using such a device for bridging the 
cultural divide are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The gap between science and humanities was famously expressed by C.P.Snow in his 1959 
Cambridge University Rede Lecture "The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution" (Snow, 1960). 
Snow was critical of the prevailing dismissive attitude towards science within Government.  In 1962 
the literary critic F.R. Leavis provided a famous rebuke to Snow suggesting that it was scientists that 
worked in a moral vacuum. In a series of essays to mark the 50th anniversary of Snow’s lecture Robert 
Whelan commented:  
 
“Snow was right to criticise the supercilious dismissal of science as not fit for gentlemen: scientific 
understanding can be both beautiful and vital for our culture. Leavis was right to call attention to 
the need for science to operate within the framework of moral values that a humane education can 
                                                        
∗ 24-27 April 2013 Belek-Antalya, Turkey 
* Address for correspondence: Dr Martin Reynolds, The Open University, Faculty of Maths, Science and Technology, Walton Hall, Milton 
Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK   E-mail address: martin.reynolds@open.ac.uk / Tel.: +44 (0) 1908 654894 
Martin Reynolds and Chris Blackmore / AWERProcedia Advences in Applied Sciences, 2013 (1) pp.233-240 
  234 
generate: the fact that science permits us to do certain things doesn't mean that we 
should.”(Whelan, 2009) 
 
Since Snow’s lecture scientists have confronted ethical dilemmas in domains ranging from 
biomedical research to atomic energy and agrichemicals, and there has been active discourse 
concerning science and ethics (for evidence of the range of reports and academic journals associated 
with such discourse see, for example, Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009).  Science-based communities engaged 
in Science and Technology Studies and Citizen Science have in particular worked with a range of 
different value positions (cf. Jasanoff, 2008). Meanwhile environmental science has progressed 
significantly with many more scientists taking up key advisory positions in environmental decision 
making; for example from the institutionalisation of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in the 
1960s through to more recent corporate responsibility reporting and reporting from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In the 1970s environmental ethics emerged as a 
recognised discipline within the wider humanities curriculum. However, the two professional 
communities – environmental scientists and environmental ethicists – and their disciplinary traditions 
have arguably remained largely disparate with little interaction.   
 
In 1997 the Technology Faculty at The Open University (OU) introduced a postgraduate module on 
Environmental Ethics (OU module code T861).  The OU distance learning module was an adaptation of 
a conventional face-to-face module developed originally at Lancaster University in collaboration with 
Wye College.  In the ensuing 10 years, modifications were made to the content in order to make the 
subject matter more accessible for the majority of OU registered science and technology-based study 
fellows wishing to become more familiar with the ethical issues of environmental practice.  An inter-
Faculty workshop was organised in 2007 to draw on the experiences of those working on the module 
with colleagues outside the Technology Faculty (including Social Sciences and the Arts Faculties) in 
order to explore the development of a replacement module.  In 2009, the OU launched TD866 – 
Environmental Responsibility: ethics, policy and action, which developed further some of the ideas of 
T861 and a Social Sciences module also coming to the end of it life - D830 Ecology, Justice and 
Citizenship. In time TD866  replaced both these earlier modules.   
 
Since 2009 nearly 400 study fellows have successfully undertaken TD866.  The gender profile has 
remained balanced (49% male). 58% come from 30-49 age range. Whilst most choose the module as 
one of many postgraduate 30-credit options to gain a qualification (e.g., a Diploma or Masters in, for 
example, Environmental Management, Development Management, Systems Thinking in Practice), 
around 15% have taken the module as a one-off 6-month part-time study.  Despite current austerity 
and uncertainty in higher education provision, there appears to remain a significant demand for 
getting to grips with ethical issues in environmental studies, mostly in order to enhance professional 
practice.   
 
At the core of the TD866 module is a heuristic, specially developed by the module team for teaching 
environmental responsibility. This paper introduces the heuristic, briefly describing what it is and how 
it is used to structure the teaching of moral issues within environmental studies.  We also provide a 
brief exploration of some implications and challenges in adapting the heuristic for wider professional 
use amongst scientists and technicians. 
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2. Environmental responsibility heuristic for teaching ethics  
The environmental responsibility heuristic was devised as a core triadic structure which at its 
simplest was based upon three questions of environmental responsibility – what matters? who 
matters? and why some issues and agents seemingly matter more than others? (see Fig.1). The 
question ‘who is responsible?’ is often expressed as the first instinctive line of inquiry into the 
uncertainties regarding responsibility. However, this question assumes some prior awareness of what 
matters or what issues are at stake. Context clearly makes a difference. A viewpoint on ‘what’ matters, 
for example, may emphasise concern for economic well-being or for ecological well-being, depending 
on whether, say, it is that of an industrial labourer in the food industry making a living in an 
impoverished country of the global South, or that of a relatively more comfortable citizen from the 
global North often with choices and means of purchasing power who can afford more concern over 
the wider ecological consequences of importing cheap food. 
 
Questions of what matters depend, therefore, on the perspective taken. It is only once some idea of 
what matters is established that it is possible to start questioning who matters and in what sense they 
matter. These questions in turn may prompt subsequent questions associated with why some issues 
are prioritised over others and why some ways of dealing with them are prioritised over others. Three 
questions of environmental responsibility can therefore be identified: firstly, the issues of 
environmental responsibility or what matters; secondly, the agency of responsibility or who matters 
and in what sense; and thirdly, the justification for responsibility – why some issues matter more than 
others and why some stakeholder roles matter more than others.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Simple expression of the environmental responsibility heuristic 
 
Fig.1 illustrates the basic heuristic of environmental responsibility based on these three questions. 
The arrows between the three triadic points signal influences. In dealing with complex issues 
2. Who  
matters  
(and in what sense)? 
Agency 
3. Why does it 
matter? 
Justification 
1. What 
matters? 
Issues 
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associated with environmental responsibility, it is helpful to keep clarity between these questions and 
consider appropriate relationships between them. For example, if the issue of alternative sources of 
energy (such as solar energy, nuclear fuels, wind and tidal power) is of concern, it is helpful to 
appreciate who is concerned (oil companies, transport companies, government agencies, 
environmental groups, individuals as consumers and/or citizens, etc.). Asking simple questions 
regarding who is benefiting and who is not benefiting from these alternative fuel sources provides 
some clarity on why these issues are deemed important. 
3. Two types of responsibility:  (informal) Caring and (more formal) Accountability 
From the outset of teaching about moral dilemmas we make clear our understanding of 
responsibility in terms of two complementary types of environmental action: first, caring for an 
environment comprising the natural world of life and life support, of which humans are an integral 
part; and second ensuring accountability for any harm or wrong done to the environment.  Both types 
of environmental action address the three recurring and interrelated questions associated with the 
environmental responsibility heuristic.  In so doing, the heuristic provides a means of making sense of 
some of the more obscure, abstract though vitally important terminology in moral philosophy 
including ‘obligations’, ‘entitlements’, ‘duty’, and ‘rights’.   
 
Here we make a distinction between the informal and formal aspects of being responsible, where 
obligations and entitlements represent the more informal aspects regarding our capacity to act, and 
duties and rights provide their more formalised codified expressions respectively. Duty and rights are 
formalised ‘liabilities’; collective agreements that whilst acknowledging individual capacities to act on 
the environment, nevertheless provide restrictions to those actions. Obligations and entitlements are 
intuitive ‘taken for granted’ attributes which provide the less formal bedrock of cultural context for 
legitimising duties and rights in order for them to remain relatively stable and uncontested.  
 
The informal and formal dimensions of environmental responsibility map roughly onto caring and 
accountability.  The informal caring/formal accountability divide can also be used to make sense of the 
vast array of ethical traditions.  Here we draw on the distinction between normative and 
philosophical ethical traditions (Des Jardins, 2001).  Normative ethics deals with intuitive notions of 
what’s good and what’s right – representing the caring dimension of responsibility. Philosophical 
ethics represents the more formalised higher level of accountability in which normative judgements 
and their supporting reasons are analysed: it represents  “ the level of the general concepts, principles, 
and theories to which we appeal in defending and explaining normative claims” (ibid p.19). 
 
At a generic level, the three points of the heuristic in Fig.1 can represent the notion of being 
environmentally responsible (item 3. Justification) in terms of informally caring about issues of 
environmental responsibility expressed through normative value judgements (item 1) and more 
formally accounting for harm and wrongdoing through our collective agency with the help of 
philosophically informed moral judgements (item 2).  At a less generic level of application, the 
heuristic can be used to make more detailed sense of (informal) caring and (more formal) 
accountability respectively. 
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3.1 Caring for the environment: using informal normative value judgements  
Normative ethics – ‘what ought to be done’ -  invites attention to who and/or what we value. 
Whereas the boundaries of the moral community for which we express a collective care have been 
extended from human-interest to include animal welfare (Nash 1989), many now consider that our 
obligations extend beyond other animals to all living organisms, or ecosystems or even the biosphere 
as a whole.   
 
In relation to environmental studies, value can be distinguished into 3 types (Reynolds, 2009 p.45): 
 
1. “Instrumental value… [e.g.] putting monetary value on environmental ‘goods’, or considering 
nature in terms of natural ‘resources’, and ecosystem ‘services’… 
2. “Intrinsic value is value ‘in itself’ …or ‘in its own right’…[i.e.] environmentalism as a social 
movement in the mid-twentieth century grew from an appreciation of intrinsic value of nature… 
3. “personal (or individual)…internally held value of the valuer… Two perspectives on the 
environment based on personal values can be distinguished – anthropocentric [placing humans in 
a privileged position over nature], and ecocentric [regarding humans as simply one part of a moral 
community consisting of all living things and non-living natural objects]” 
 
An individual’s perspective and where they place their boundaries depend on the particular context 
in which they are expressing their personal values. In a situation where disease-causing organisms 
such as the malarial Plasmodium, and its main vector the Anopheles mosquito, are prevalent, we 
might be forgiven for having an anthropocentric perspective in trying to eliminate such life forms for 
the benefit of other humans. The circumstances determine what our values are and what perspective 
we might have. In issues relating to the environment, there are usually multiple values held by 
different people, which are often in conflict.  
 
Caring for the environment requires attention to these different values.  Each type corresponds 
respectively to the three triadic poles of the heuristic. Our concern for ‘what matters’ might be 
regarded as a basic and wider application of instrumental value. In practicing responsibility in a less 
formal sense, we may assume entitlements which provide us with capacities to act regarding these 
value judgements.  Our concern for ‘who matters and in what sense’ might be seen as an extension of 
intrinsic value. Our informal obligations may correspondingly indicate that we are constrained by 
considering the effects of our activities on others (including non-human nature).  Finally, our personal 
values signal the means by which we justify our value judgements (instrumental and intrinsic) and 
hence informally justify associated entitlements and obligations in any particular context of action or 
decision making. 
3.2 Accountability and the environment:  using formal philosophical ethics 
Most people carry around a useful set of day-to-day rules that regulate behaviour towards the 
natural environment – for example, it is bad to pollute, it is wrong to endanger life. But often there is a 
need to go further. Pollution may be bad but does it mean that cooking food through burning fuel is 
bad? Or where it is wrong to endanger life, is it wrong to kill living things for food or to kill disease-
causing organisms? When applying everyday normative notions of good and bad, right and wrong 
some basic insights from philosophical ethics can provide a means of structuring responses to such 
questions of environmental responsibility in a more informed manner. Philosophical ethics maps out 
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three theoretical traditions.  The ethical traditions and associated three moral dilemmas relating to 
environmental responsibility can be summarised: 
 
1 Doing what’s good: this constitutes a consequentialist ethic that considers good and bad (harmful) 
to be drivers of ethical action. It is the consequences of an action that determine a response to the 
moral dilemma of whether it is right or wrong. Examples include theories  of utilitarianism. 
2 Doing what’s right: this constitutes a deontological ethic that considers right and wrong to be 
independent of consequences. It focuses on the moral dilemma of duty – the rightness or 
wrongness of actions themselves – as opposed to the rightness or wrongness of the consequences 
of those actions. Examples include rights-based approaches and contract theory 
3 Being responsible: this constitutes a virtue ethic that considers character formation to be a 
determining factor in addition to either calculations of consequence or the rightness or wrongness 
of the action itself. It focuses on the moral dilemma of character – virtue or vice (being virtuous or 
vicious). Examples here invite attention to ideas on environmental justice, deep environmentalism 
and deep ecology 
The three traditions again map on to the heuristic.  Consequentialist ethic is associated with ‘what 
matters’; deontological ethics relate to ‘who matters’, and virtue-based ethics relate to questions of 
justification and why things matter.   
4. Challenges 
The environmental responsibility heuristic is a model – a human device. Like all devices generated 
by Homo sapiens we need to apply it with care and circumspection.  As described above, the heuristic 
can be used either at a generic level (Fig.1) for appreciating the relevance between caring (cf. item 1 
on Fig.1) and accountability (cf. item 2) for enacting environmental responsibility (cf. item 3). Or it can 
be used at a finer level of granularity to map out the purposefulness of either caring for the 
environment (different values informing entitlements and obligations) and/or demonstrating 
accountability (different ethical traditions informing issues of duty, rights, and/or virtues). Whichever 
level of granularity is being applied, it is important though not to lose sight of the relationship 
between the triadic points and engage with the arrows of influence and their composite emergent 
effect;  the whole is more than the sum of its parts.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates how we have used the heuristic introduced in Part 1 of the module to help 
navigate through Parts 2 to 4 of the module .    Dividing the two moral dilemmas of informal caring 
(doing what’s good) and more formal accountability (doing what’s right) might also unnecessarily  
accentuate an unhelpful divide too much. A general challenge is to bridge these dimensions in 
focusing more on the overriding moral dilemma of  being  responsible – focussing on the arrows of 
influence rather than the triadic endpoints. 
 
Two classic readings from Aldo Leopold (A Land Ethic, 1948), and Rachel Carson (Silent Spring, 1962) 
are used in the accompanying The Environmental Responsibility Reader (Reynolds et al., 2009) to 
exemplify the bridge between science and humanities and the significant influence of scientists on 
ethical debate.  Both scientists, each with particularly astute moral insights, demonstrate the ease 
with which scientific thinking can contribute significantly to the transition from caring to 
accountability.  
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Figure 2 Environmental responsibility heuristic for guiding module 
(from TD866 Environmental Responsibility Study Guide, Part 1 p.62) 
 
The question is how to nurture similar capacities in our education system; a system typically 
segregated in Faculties accentuating disciplinary divides.  Drawing on feedback from science-based 
study fellows regarding our teaching of moral philosophy, three recurring challenges exist.  Firstly, 
given that time is an increasingly scarce resource, particularly for mature students working towards 
continual professional development,  there is a risk of overloading any curriculum.  The challenge is to 
allow space for study fellows to work with their own issues of relevance.  In part we do this by allowing 
students to choose their own area of interest to work on as part of a project-based end-of-module 
assessment. Secondly, there are peculiar challenges in teaching moral philosophy for enabling 
interactive discussions and conversation along with supportive tutoring. Whilst face to face 
conversations are always preferable, online discussion forums and/or the use of virtual conferencing 
tools, both properly moderated, significantly enhances the learning experience.  Thirdly, whilst issues 
of relevance may be engaged with, and appropriate platforms for conversation and deliberation 
provided, the experience of learning in moral philosophy for scientists and technologists invites study 
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fellows to move from their comfort zones.  Adapting the model for different users at different levels of 
engagement with appropriate language is therefore important 
5. Summary 
“At the heart of a liberal education is the notion that human beings are capable of moving from 
barbarism to civilisation by using their intellectual and moral capacities – and that is an idea which 
ought to unite scientists and literary intellectuals alike.”  (Whelan, 2009).  
 
Using the environmental responsibility heuristic, a unity of action is defined in terms of two 
dimensions: (i) an informal sense of caring for environment, and (ii) a more formal sense of providing 
codified constraints and regulations for accountability. Less formal ideas of responsibility can be 
understood in terms of nurturing values and obligations, and reflecting on entitlements; whereas 
more formal aspects of environmental responsibility can be understood in terms of formulating 
‘rights’ that may circumscribe entitlements, and ‘duties’ providing formal expression of obligations. 
The two dimensions of responsibility address three recurring and interrelated questions of 
responsibility: what matters, in terms of issues; who matters (and how), in terms of agency; and why 
some issues and stakeholders are prioritised over others, in terms of justification.  The informal and 
formal dimensions of responsibility could be seen as being aligned with the normative and 
philosophical dimensions of ethics respectively, but in reality there is considerable overlap between 
the two. Three formal traditions of environmental ethics– consequentialist, deontological and virtue-
based ethics – along with some other traditions associated with environmental philosophy may 
support improved understanding and practice, both in the informal and the formal dimensions of 
environmental responsibility. 
 
In examining what issues are of importance, questions arise with respect to who are they important 
to and why.  Raising these questions in a systematic manner can help to counter the often-expressed 
concerns of despair (at the multitude of issues at stake), apathy (how can I get to grips with such 
issues?) and cynicism (why bother?). 
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